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Editor's Note: In June 1995, the Chicago Historical Society bestowed its 
first annual Making History Awards on a group ofChicagoans who have 
made historic contributions to the city. The inaugural group included 
Gwendolyn Brooks, John Hope Franklin, Robert W. Galvin, Leon Led-
erman, Judge Abraham Lincoln Marovitz, and Studs Terkel. Historian 
Timothy Gilfoyle has been conducting interviews with each of the honorees 
and, in the first of a series of articles, he explores the lives and careers of 
businessman Robert W. Galvin, former chairman of Motorola, Inc., and 
Professor Leon Lederman. 
At first glance, Leon M. Lederman and Robert W. Galvin have 
little in common. Lederman—a Nobel Prize-winning physicist, 
raised in the Bronx by Russian immigrants, educated at Columbia 
University—has devoted the entirety of his professional life to the 
academy as a research scientist, laboratory director, and university 
professor. Robert Galvin, in contrast, was born and bred in the 
Midwest, the scion and heir-apparent of the founder of Motorola, 
Inc. As a seven-year-old, Galvin accompanied his father to com-
pany meetings and business trips across the country. If anyone 
ever was, Robert Galvin was "born" to be a corporate president. 
A closer examination, however, uncovers common ground in 
these seemingly disparate careers in science and industry. As 
youths, for instance, both were born into devoted families of 
modest means. Paul Galvin's later success in manufacturing was 
not so apparent when his only child was born in 1922. "My father 
and mother [Lillian Galvin] moved to a little town in Wisconsin 
where I was born," remembers Robert Galvin. "In that commu-
nity, he had gone to work with one of his boyhood acquaintances, 
. . . but that company went bankrupt in the course of the early 
months of my life in that little town. So my father and mother had 
to motor pennilessly to an aunt and uncle on the South Side [of 
Chicago], and that's where they kind of established our family, 
and gradually he caught on to having a means of taking care of 
my mother and myself." 
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Above: Paul Galvin holding his two-
year-old son Robert, 1924. 
Below: Undated photograph of Paul 
and Robert Galvin. As a youngster, 
Robert often accompanied his father 
on business trips. 
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Galvin describes his father's entrepreneurial sensibility as 
"almost genetic—he always knew he wanted to be in business." 
When Paul Galvin's partner elected to restart the company in 
Chicago, he joined him again. "And in not too many early years, 
the man's company went bankrupt," recalls Galvin. "On this occa-
sion, however, there was a . . . product line of that company that 
had very inexpensive tools . . . . And my father acquired the tools 
at auction, walked across the street, literally, with about a half a 
dozen people, . . . and started a little company to make the battery 
eliminators." So began Motorola. 
Lederman endured few of the economic insecurities and early 
failures that beset the Galvins. The Bronx, he remembers, "was a 
great place. It was a good place to grow up. I had schools within a 
few blocks of the house, a public school and a high school [were] 
nearby. I had friends. We had a wonderful city [New York] we 
could wander around in. There was no problem about traveling 
around the city, going into the subway and trying to get lost and 
coming out some unknown place and finding out it was a province 
called Brooklyn. . . . The schools were excellent. The teachers 
were very well educated and dedicated, and I remember many of 
them as being stimulating, exciting. That was a wonderful time to 
grow up." 
Above left: Robert and Paul Galvin, 
c. 1950. By 1956, the younger 
Galvin was president of Motorola. 
Above: Robert presented Motorola's 
"Twenty-Five-Year Service Pin" to his 
father on October 24, 1953. 
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Robert Galvin was only six when, in 1928, his father founded the 
Galvin Manufacturing Corporation at 847 West Harrison Street. 
The market for battery eliminators, however, was quickly evapo-
rating, as their main application for use in battery-operated home 
radios became obsolete. So Paul Galvin moved the company into an 
entirely new product line—the car radio. What was an unheard of 
and high-risk innovation in 1930 soon became commonplace in the 
expanding car culture sweeping the United States. The "first com-
mercial auto radio" was the "Motorola," a name signifying both 
motion and the radio. The Motorola's popularity convinced Paul 
Galvin to rename the company after it in 1947. 
After growing up in Rogers Park and Evanston, Robert Galvin 
attended the University of Notre Dame for two years before joining 
the Army Signal Corps in 1942. At the end of World War II, 
he returned to his father's 
company, working first as a 
stock boy and eventually as a 
production-line troubleshooter. 
Galvin quickly advanced within 
the ranks before being pro-
moted to executive vice presi-
dent in 1948 and president in 
1956, only three years before 
his father died. 
When Robert Galvin as-
sumed control, Motorola was a 
$227-million-a-year company 
manufacturing car radios, 
walkie-talkies, solid-state color 
televisions, and phonographs. 
Over the ensuing three de-
cades, he transformed Mo-
Above left: Father and son share 
lunch in the Motorola cafeteria, 
1954. Above: Robert Galvin with one 
of his teammates on an Evanston soft-
ball team, 1957. Galvin played 
second base. 
Below: Paul and Robert Galvin dis-




torola into an $ 11 -billion-a-year giant in electronics, employing 
over one hundred thousand people. Like his father more than a 
half-century earlier, Galvin completely abandoned several product 
lines for others. By 1990, Motorola had jettisoned its television 
business and was the leading manufacturer of two-way radios, cel-
lular phones, pagers, and advanced dispatch systems for commer-
cial fleets. It was the fourth-largest maker of semiconductors. 
Unlike IBM, which faltered upon entering a new technological 
phase (moving from mainframe computers to personal com-
puters), Motorola nimbly moved from conventional two-way 
radios and TVs to cellular radios and pagers. 
Motorola's success generated political appointments 
for Galvin. In 1970, he served on the President's Commission 
for International Trade and Investment. From 1982 to 1985, 
Galvin chaired the Industry 
Policy Advisory Committee to 
the U.S. Special Representa-
tive to the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations. During that 
time, Motorola attacked Jap-
anese producers for "dump-
ing" cellular phones in the 
United States, a charge later 
upheld by the International 
Trade Commission. Galvin 
was later credited as a key 
architect in opening up the 
Japanese semiconductor mar-
ket in 1986. 
In 1990, Galvin retired as 
Motorola's chairman, but re-
mains involved in long-term 
corporate planning as the 
head of Motorola's executive 
committee. Since then, he has been inducted into the National 
Business Hall of Fame and received the National Medal of Tech-
nology. Just prior to his retirement as chairman, Galvin was 
named one of the first recipients of the Malcolm Baldridge 
National Quality Award from the Department of Commerce 
(1989), specifically for making products with zero imperfections. 
Indeed, future historians will most likely equate Galvin's tenure 
at Motorola with "virtual perfection." In 1978, after general sales 
manager Art Sundry pointed out numerous poor features in 
Motorola's product line, Galvin began emphasizing "total quality." 
In his words, Motorola adopted "a culture of intending that we 
never do anything that would dissatisfy the customer." Proponents 
sometimes referred to this as the "six sigma" philosophy. 
According to Galvin, "a sigma is a standard deviation from norm, 
and in statistical quality control parlance, if you can . . . build . . . 
a product or a service to where all the variations stay within six 
standard deviations from norm and fit your specifications, you will 
Carl Lindholm, Robert Galvin, and 
Bo Yibo, Vice Chairman of the Cen-
tral Advisory Committee of the 
People's Republic of China, October 
1986. 
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In 1988, President Ronald Reagan 
presented Galvin with the Malcolm 
Baldridge National Quality Award 
(below). Left: Galvin addresses the 
U.S. Department of Commerce audi-
ence after the presentation. 
have only 3.4 items outside the range of every million of some-
thing you do. This translates into, when you finally work the 
system right, a quality level of 3.4 defects per million. And we call 
that 'virtual perfection.'" Galvin admits that Motorola examined 
the ideas of W. Edwards Deming and other postwar industrial 
theorists, but in the end "we finally came up with . . . our own 
system. We were just either screwy enough or different enough 
[to] . . . let ourselves develop our own system." 
Virtual perfection departed dramatically from the scientific 
management techniques developed by Frederick Winslow Taylor 
early in the twentieth century. According to Galvin, "the six sigma 
systems . . . are quite different from the Taylor advocacy. . . . An 
overly simplified way of characterizing the Taylor approach was 
that it was a top-down phenomenon. If I measured your time, I 
could figure out how to tell you how to use your time better, and I 
would think of a system, and then I'd ask—I'd require—you to use 
my system." 
Whereas Taylorism broke down and measured factory floor 
production to the individual worker, Motorola organized workers 
into independent "self-directed teams." According to Galvin, the 
teams "have no supervisor. Somewhere along the line there's 
somebody in the building that has some authority, and they see 
that person in terms of human interrelationships from time to 
time, but they may never get an order from that person." In con-
trast to Taylor's system, which imposed management directives 
on workers, Galvin asked: "Why don't we trust our people to 
determine from the bottom up what needs to be done? Once 
we've decided what needs to be done, we very often institution-
alize that for a temporary period of time. . . . And we teach our-
selves to follow that process so that we have a 'no mistakes' 
methodology of getting a function done, but in the meantime 
we're studying how to improve it, and the people who do the job 
are figuring out the improvements." 
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Galvin insists that virtual perfection not only rejected the prin-
ciples of Taylorism, but actually saved immense amounts of time. 
"We now know that if we perform a function perfectly, we do it 
faster, or if we aim to do a function faster, we have to figure out 
how to get rid of the parts that cause the mistakes or the delays 
. . . and then we end up with better quality," claims Galvin. "You 
can almost start from either end of that pole and come to a very 
satisfactory result, but it depends on Mr. and Mrs. Everyman 
being the authors of what happens versus Mr. Taylor's plan pre-
scribing for the rest of us." Characteristically, there is not a single 
time clock in any Motorola plant. 
A major ingredient in Motorola's success and longevity has 
been its ability to adapt to changing conditions in the American 
economy. Consider the invention of the transistor in 1948, 
remarks Galvin. "We didn't know that was coming in 1947. The 
laser is a surprise. The computer is a surprise. In 1940, I didn't 
know that there would be a computer. . . . Now, those things are 
historical facts. They are events that took place, and they can be 
aggregated under the rubric of a surprise. The consequence of 
that is, that none of the companies that my father looked up to 
when I started here as a stock boy in 1940, are in any of the busi-
nesses that we're in today. Historically, most institutions do not 
adapt to the next surprises. That's a lesson about human beings. It 
happens to be an historical fact of the last fifty years. I believe you 
could find the same history the prior fifty years and the prior fifty 
years. We did adapt. I think there's something special about that. I 
Galvin visits employees on the 
assembly line, 1959. 
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Above: At the 1971 Chicago Public 
Schools Math and Science Confer-
ence, Galvin talks with a student and 
a school official. Left: Galvin testifies 




think that we had an orientation to 'renewal,' and every time 
something new happens, why can't we do it? It's a 'why not' versus 
'why would anybody do that' or 'we're so satisfied.'" 
While Galvin was searching for perfection in the workplace, 
Leon Lederman was looking for the same in his laboratories. After 
attending James Monroe High School, Lederman received his 
bachelor of science degree from the City College of New York in 
1943 and his Ph.D. in physics from Columbia University in 1951. 
He spent the next twenty-eight years as a professor at Columbia, 
simultaneously serving as director of Nevis Labs from 1962 to 
1979 and occupying the Higgins Chair in Physics from 1972 to 
1979. Lederman then moved to Chicago to assume the director-
ship of the Enrico Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fer-
milab) in Batavia, Illinois. 
Lederman remains one of the most prolific and honored scien-
tists of his generation, authoring more than two hundred publica-
tions on the properties and interactions of elementary particles. His 
most noted discoveries include the neutral K-meson particle (1956) 
and a new elementary particle called the "bottom quark" or "B 
Quark" (1977). Lederman was even involved in research leading to 
the invention of Doppler Radar. His numerous awards and honors 
include fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation (1958-59), 
the Ford Foundation (1958-59), the Ernest Kempton Adams Foun-
dation (1961), and the National Science Foundation (1967), as well 
as the National Medal of Science (1965), the Wolf Prize in Physics 
(1982), the Enrico Fermi Award (1992), and the presidency of 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (1991-93). 
The capstone of Lederman's scientific career came in 1988 
when he was awarded the Nobel Prize in physics for the discovery 
of the muon neutrino while working in 1961 and 1962 at 
Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island. Subatomic par-
ticles with essentially no mass, neutrinos pass effortlessly through 
objects, including the earth. Although the existence of neutrinos 
was suggested as early as 1931, Lederman was among the first to 
produce and study the particles in a laboratory. The research led 
to the use of neutrino beams to probe the structure of matter and 
helped demonstrate that there were fundamental symmetries 
among subatomic particles. In recent years, physicists have relied 
on neutrinos to develop theories uniting some of the basic forces 
of nature. 
Upon assuming the directorship of Fermilab in 1979, Lederman 
remembers that "my first task . . . was to build that machine." "That 
machine" was the Tevatron—the world's first superconducting syn-
chrotron and the most powerful particle accelerator. Sometimes 
called an "atom smasher," Tevatron is a superconducting magnet 
system contained within a 6.3 kilometer circular tunnel called the 
"main ring." Unlike other accelerators, Tevatron had the capability 
of "capturing" antiprotons in a storage ring. This allowed scientists 
to "gradually build up the number of antiprotons and squeeze them 
together—a very, very elaborate choreography of many rings and 
many technologies," says Lederman. 
Leon Lederman as a child. 
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The Tevatron produced different kinds of antiprotons. Once 
inserted into the main ring, they ran in opposite directions from 
the protons. Circling each other in clockwise and counter-
clockwise directions, the protons and antiprotons were acceler-
ated to high energy speeds. "Then you make head-on colli-
sions," states Lederman. "A head-on collision is much more 
violent than the standard collisions of a particle with something 
at rest. In other words, if a Mack truck hits a Ping-Pong ball, not 
much happens to the Ping-Pong ball; it just flies off, and nothing 
much happens to the truck. But if two Mack trucks collide head-
on, then you get CB radios and horns and fenders . . . flying off 
in all directions. And violent collisions are the things we want to 
learn about, because they teach us more about physics." 
The Tevatron quickly surpassed its major competitor, the 
accelerator at CERN in Switzerland, playfully described by Led-
erman as "the laboratory we 
love to hate." CERN had suc-
cessfully experimented with 
head-on collisions of antipro-
tons, "but the energy [at 
CERN] was a lot lower," 
remembers Lederman. So in 
the late 1980s, the Tevatron 
and CERN programs were 
competing to discover the 
"top quark." "At that point, 
the race was a draw," says 
Lederman. "Neither labora-
tory had found the top, but 
CERN had exhausted its pos-
sibilities, and Fermilab was 
just getting started. Because 
our energy was 2.5 times higher, . . . our possibilities were much 
higher. And in fact, in 1994, the Fermilab group published the 
first evidence for the top quark. In 1995 it was confirmed, so 
now we have a top quark, also found at Fermilab." 
By some measures, the Tevatron epitomizes the vigor and 
vitality of American science in the Cold War era. Since 1991, 
Tevatron has been the world's most powerful source of data on 
elementary particles, "the workhorse of American physics and 
the most powerful machine in the world, especially now that 
we've lost the Superconducting Super Collider [in Texas]," 
argues Lederman. The Tevatron confirmed many predictions of 
the Standard Model, the central theory of elementary particles, 
allowing investigators to explore a domain where "no human 
eyeball has ever set foot," according to one mixed metaphor. 
These specialized pursuits for "top quarks" and "virtual perfec-
tion" reverberated beyond the confines of Fermilab and Motorola. 
Both proved critical to the emergence of metropolitan Chicago's 
most significant "technoburbs" or "edge cities"—Naperville and 
Schaumburg. Since 1945, the combination of retail shopping 
Above: The "two neutrino" experiment 
team, c. 1961. Brookhaven National 
Laboratory, New York. Opposite: 
Leon Lederman as a graduate stu-
dent, c. 1946, with a cloud chamber, 
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malls, industrial parks, and 
professional office centers on 
the outskirts of cities—all 
linked together by interstate 
highways—have produced a 
new form of suburbanization. 
By 1994, for example, 
Schaumburg's 193,396 em-
ployees doubled the number 
found in individual down-
towns such as Atlanta and 
Minneapolis. Furthermore, 
Schaumburg had more eating 
and drinking establishments 
than Portland, more Asian 
residents than lower Manhattan, and more professional corpora-
tions than downtown Houston. The construction of Motorola's 
new, 325-acre international headquarters in the 1970s was funda-
mental to Schaumburg's growth. 
Naperville, thirty miles west of Chicago's Loop and a short dis-
tance from Fermilab, more than doubled its population during 
the 1980s, reaching 85,351. Established in 1831 (making it 
DuPage County's oldest community), by 1990, Naperville's 
employment base was supported by AT&T, Amoco, Dow Jones, 
Nalco Chemical, and Northern Illinois Gas. Much of this is cen-
tered along the seventeen-mile stretch of the East-West Tollway 
(Interstate 88; opened in 1958), sometimes called the Illinois 
Research and Development Corridor. Argonne National Labora-
tory, an outgrowth of the Manhattan Project research at the Uni-
versity of Chicago during World War II, was established southeast 
of Naperville in 1947 by the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Fermilab, along with Bell Telephone Laboratories and the 
Amoco Research Center, was a key ingredient to the economic 
growth of the Naperville area after 1960. One hundred twenty-
five proposals suggesting more than two hundred sites in forty-six 
states lobbied for the first "truly national laboratory" in the 1960s. 
Lederman notes that "the Chicago area proposal was considered 
the best. And it had the usual things in it: nearby major airport; 
people could get to it. . . . The climate was . . . satisfactory. The 
area had . . . a well-trained workforce, with the possibility of the 
existence of some local companies of high technology, . . . and the 
state was very good at saying, 'We will acquire the land. We'll pick 
up the land.' The land was very flat, and the geology was very 
good, and so there was no problem in having the site . . . thirty or 
forty feet underground." 
In the end, Fermilab "just outweighed all the other proposals," 
argues Lederman. "It was taken seriously by the state and by a com-
munity that was very pro getting this machine there." Indeed, the 
state and local communities donated approximately sixty-eight 
hundred acres of land. Not surprisingly, when Fermilab opened, "it 
almost doubled the money—federal money—spent in this area, . . . 
On his sixtieth birthday, Professor 
Lederman delivered the lecture 
"Innerspace, Outerspace" at Fer-
milab. Opposite: King Charles XVI of 
Sweden presents the Nobel Prize to 
Lederman. 
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and lots of little high-tech companies sprang up around Fermilab. 
Certainly when I got there, we began a very close collaboration. We 
were used to each other and . . . this acted as an attractive feature 
for bringing government people in, because they could visit two labs 
with one blow. And so I think that was very positive, certainly very 
positive for the Chicago area, because some huge fraction, . . . 50, 
60, 70 percent of the [federal] funds are spent locally, both for 
salaries of people who live there and for local contractors and local 
suppliers of various materials." 
Fermilab, in fact, engaged in industrial production during Led-
erman's tenure. The Tevatron required over one thousand mag-
nets, each twenty feet long. No manufacturer anywhere in the 
world produced such a product. "So we needed a factory," 
remembers Lederman. "We didn't really know how to make mag-
nets, so the factory was an assembly line. That's what a factory is. 
And the assembly line would produce some terrible magnets, and 
we'd try to find out why they were so terrible, and we'd find out 
that we have to change this and that. We made the change in the 
tooling of the assembly line, and we kept going this way, hoping 
that at some point, a good magnet would be produced. And then 
we'd have two things: one good magnet and a mass production 
capability. . . . [W]hat fed the factory were materials from 
industry—the wires, the cables, the clamps, the stainless steel 
devices—all the things that were needed from industry, but we 
decided that this factory had to have intimate control . . . of it." 
When working at full capacity, the factory employed about two 
hundred to three hundred workers. "And it produced the thou-
sand magnets and probably another two hundred or three hun-
dred other kinds of superconducting kinds of devices that were 
needed for this thing. And most of the workers were people who 
were moonlighting. They were housewives and taxi drivers and 
off-duty policemen." 
In the latter years of their careers, Galvin and Lederman 
became strong advocates of new and innovative forms of educa-
tion. Beginning with the Motorola Training and Education 
Center, a corporate-training department that opened in 1981, 
Galvin was one of the first to introduce continuous training pro-
grams for employees in his American factories. Along with 
Motorola University and the Galvin Center for Continuing 
Education (established in 1986), Motorola employed new 
delivery technologies such as computer-based training, elec-
tronic publishing, satellite communications, and other interac-
tive training systems to serve as both classroom training 
facilities and electronic distribution points. The system enabled 
Motorola employees to attend in-depth seminars without 
leaving their work locations. Satellite-transmitted seminars soon 
replaced business trips. By 1985, Motorola devoted more than 
one million hours to training twenty-five thousand of its ninety 




Galvin envisioned Motorola University supplementing the 
existing system of higher education. "We couldn't expect the gen-
eral system to provide us with the particular things that we needed 
to have. To the extent that we also need the general system, we go 
out and use that. To the extent that we duplicate a little bit of what 
the general system does, it's because it fits compatibly with all 
these specialty things that we just have to have for ourselves. We 
had to train every employee. We have to train currently, every 
employee in the company, statistical quality-control principles. 
Well, if we went to the professor at [a] university, he would have, 
probably, a wonderful course in statistical quality control. We just 
want these nine pieces of that course, and we want it in four days, 
because that's what we need to be on one of these teams." 
In 1986, Leon Lederman helped establish the Illinois Mathe-
matics and Science Academy, one of the nation's first residential 
secondary schools created specifically for gifted students in the sci-
ences. "Kids hate to be different," Lederman recognizes, "and 
very bright kids know they're different when they're in normal 
schools, and they react to that differentness in many different 
ways. But here, they're all the same. They're all . . . academically 
gifted and work together and collaborate and . . . have excellent 
teachers. While the building was a hand-me-down from the over-
building of schools in the early '70s, it works, and it's a very 
splendid school." 
Below: Lederman created Fermilab's 
Children's Center, a daycare facility 
for employee use, in 1981. Here he 
visits the center on his sixtieth 
birthday. 
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Lederman left Fermilab in 1989, first becoming the Frank E. 
Sulzberger Professor at University of Chicago and later the 
Pritzker Professor of Science at Illinois Institute of Technology 
(IIT). During that time, he founded the Teachers Academy for 
Mathematics and Science (TAMS) at IIT. TAMS had a goal of 
enrolling the seventeen thousand math and science teachers in 
Chicago's 550 public schools over a seven-year period for a sixteen-
week intensive course introducing new and innovative ways of 
teaching science and math. If successful, Lederman hoped to 
duplicate the program in other U.S. cities. 
TAMS, Lederman acknowledges, was an outgrowth of the 
school reform movement of the late 1980s. In 1989, there was "a 
lot of excitement about fixing the Chicago public schools. And 
one of the issues that was raised at some of the many meetings I 
attended was the fact that elementary teachers don't know how to 
teach math and science. And so that gave rise to the notion that 
we might try to help them as university people." With support 
from the Council of Presidents of local universities, the Depart-
ment of Energy, the National Science Foundation, and the state of 
Illinois, TAMS sought to "retool" elementary education instruc-
tors teaching math and science. "[T]he vast majority," claims Led-
erman, "have no training in math and science, and too often 
approach the subject with the same fear and loathing as anyone 
else and transmit that to the kids, and that's terrible." Lederman 
admits the program had a "rocky" start. By beginning on a large 
scale, he believed, they hoped to quickly adapt to the demands to 
improve science education in the entire city of Chicago, "because 
we wanted to fix the whole city. This is the megalomania of the 
physicist, perhaps. . . . The federal government's getting harder 
and harder to count on, and so we're trying to switch over to state 
and local sources of money. That's where we are at the moment." 
Both Lederman and Galvin express frustration regarding the 
failure of Congress to support ongoing, scientific research, specifi-
cally the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) in Texas. 
Designed to be the world's largest and most sophisticated 
machine in the history of experimental physics, construction of 
the SSC began in the 1980s. But in 1993, fears of cost overruns 
and federal deficits induced Congress to abruptly halt funding. 
Virtually overnight, construction of the SSC stopped. Based upon 
his experiences as an evaluator of the National Science Founda-
tion and other scientific enterprises, Galvin simply describes it as 
"a tragedy." Ultimately, "we will fail to learn on the early side 
some surprising revelations that science would likely have pro-
vided us, and we don't know what they are. . . . Discoveries are dis-
coveries, and there is so much about this creation that we don't yet 
know. . . . But every four or five years we say, 'Wow! Wasn't that a 
great discovery that we made. I guess we know everything.' And 
then four years later we discover something else we were so sur-
prised to learn. But people have their hearts in a different place. 
. . . Someday we'll have another tool, and we'll finally discover 
what might have been discovered in 1999 or 2002, and we'll dis-
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cover it in 2022 or 2032. Too 
bad. A whole generation will 
have lost whatever the social, 
medical, economic benefits 
that would have been." 
For Lederman, the rejec-
tion of the SSC had a more 
ominous meaning. "When it 
happened in 1993, the mes-
sage wasn't clear," he con-
cedes. Admittedly, the federal 
government needed "to rein 
in the budget and to solve the 
deficit. . . . But by now it's 
1995, [and] we realize that 
was the first shot in a war that 
the government, but mostly 
the new Congress [elected in 1994], is waging against science. I 
think that science is now under tremendous stress across the 
board. It's not only particle physics; it's all physics and chemistry 
and biology." 
According to Lederman, the long-term impact of this and 
related congressional decisions has catastrophic implications. 
"[W]e're damaging the future prospects of our children and grand-
children. No question about it. We have a certain capital of basic 
knowledge that we're running through in applying this to industry 
and technology. That's going to run out." 
Ironically, these negative forbodings harken back to the educa-
tions of Lederman and Galvin alike. The former readily admits he 
profited from free public schools from kindergarten through col-
lege and later with graduate school and postdoctoral fellowships. 
"[A]t some point, . . . somebody made it easy for me. I had good 
schools. Who did that? Somebody did that. I had plenty of money 
to do my research. Who did that? How did that come about? 
Somebody did that." In Lederman's mind, the older generation of 
scientists are responsible for the next. Indeed, "at some point, you 
have to take your turn and see if you can do that for others, and 
I'll tell you, it's not easy," he admits. "I mean, those guys who did 
it all for me must [not] have had it easy, because this is very hard." 
Galvin even attributes the origins of virtual perfection to his 
elementary education at St. Jerome's School in Rogers Park. "On 
a given occasion, whatever the grade was—fourth, fifth, or sixth, 
and I think the nun's name was Sister Mary Norberdette—the 
assignment . . . was announced that on Friday there would be a 
test on fractions to decimals, decimals to fractions. . . . And she 
said there was only one grade acceptable, and that was 100 per-
cent. Well, of course, we all went home to our parents and raised 
Cain about that. . . . My recollection is about a third of the kids in 
the class got a hundred, and the rest of them all survived. . . . But 
the interesting thing about that [is] that here was a nun that was 
generating a standard, a level of expectation of perfection. And 
Leon Lederman poses for the press on 
October 19, 1988, the day the Nobel 
Prize announcement was made. 
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. . . isn't it interesting that I was given the introduction to the right 
standard in fourth, fifth, or sixth grade when this nun said, 
'There's only one acceptable answer—100 percent.' And now, 
finally, when I'm about fifty-five or sixty years of age, I've finally 
come to the realization, it's doable and it better be done. And so 
we set much higher standards in our [Motorola] corporation." 
Both are distressed by the possibility that American society is 
unwittingly abdicating its historic commitment to scientific excel-
lence. Galvin criticizes "those who would act rashly with regard to 
what funds are being allowed and afforded by the federal govern-
ment, which for the most part, end up being applied in universi-
ties where the greatest research is done in our society." For 
Galvin, the question is clear-cut: "Will there be enough research 
being done in government laboratories? I am of the side that I 
would err on the side of doing more, because I think science 
finally seeds the next economic development." 
Lederman passionately argues that American society is belea-
guered by an educational crisis. "At the moment," he contends, 
"the American public is not terribly interested in schools." Led-
erman concurs with recent education critics who contend that the 
poor quality of public education has made the United States "a 
nation at risk." He admits that "although there are a lot of nice 
stories about successes here and there, the center of mass hasn't 
moved very much." Equally ominous is the public's ignorance 
about science. By one measure, 97 percent of the American public 
is illiterate in science. Lederman reminds Americans that "illit-
eracy is a shame of nations," a catastrophe in the making. For sci-
ence to remain a positive force in American society, "we've got to 
raise that understanding so that we can preserve a democratic 
process, and maybe send some wiser and more knowledgeable 
people to Washington." 
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"Blackboard Bungle," The Sciences (Jan.-Feb. 1995), 16-20. Robert Galvin 
and Leon Lederman await their biographers. 
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